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strategy before presenting a thorough
examination of operations and tactical
considerations for both land and maritime forces involved in the campaign.
The outcome in Norway was never a
foregone conclusion. Germany’s tactical
prowess and brilliant leadership at the
small-unit level are conveyed nicely,
leaving the reader to actually wonder
throughout the narrative whether the
Germans can pull off such a bold and
daring feat of arms.
It is a tribute to Rhys-Jones’s authoritative approach to the subject matter and
his fine writing style that he has created
such a useful study of the elements—
the matching of strategy and policy, the
conduct of joint operations, and the
wisdom of opening a new theater—
while at the same time telling a riveting
story.
Any student of grand strategy, as well as
the casual reader, will find plenty of
value in this well written historical narrative. If there is a waiting list of books
to be included into the curriculum at
the Naval War College, this book
should top the list.
JEFF SHAW

Naval War College

Kuehn, John T. Agents of Innovation: The General
Board and the Design of the Fleet That Defeated the
Japanese Navy. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute
Press, 2008. 296pp. $32.95

Skeptics of disarmament treaties, such
as Richard Pearl, have long argued that
these treaties make a nation weaker by
depriving it of the means of self-defense.
John Kuehn, former naval aviator and
presently professor of military history
at the U.S. Army Command and

General Staff College, in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is far more subtle in this
excellent book. He shows how the
Washington Naval Treaty of 1921 froze
battleship construction and yet made
the U.S. Navy stronger by 1941. While
it is never easy to prove something so
counterintuitive, Kuehn does it hands
down.
How did this happen? First, by freezing
the building of battleships the treaty
drove the Navy to invest more time,
money, and imagination into other
projects, particularly submarines and
aircraft carriers. These ships had greater
potential than the battleship, which had
just about reached its maximum technology by the end of World War I. In
addition, by preventing the United
States from enhancing its base fortifications west of Hawaii, the treaty drove
the Navy to design new vessels of much
greater operational radius, build floating dry docks, and enhance its total
transport capabilities. By World War II,
the U.S. Navy could do the seemingly
impossible: beat a peer competitor in
the western Pacific without permanent
bases in the area of operations.
One wonders why the Japanese did not
take advantage of the constraints imposed by U.S. arms limitations. Kuehn
offers a convincing explanation, by focusing on the General Board of the U.S.
Navy. Whereas the Royal Navy and the
Imperial Japanese Navy were hierarchal
and faction ridden, the U.S. General
Board was collegial, collaborative, and
remarkably open to new ideas from all
branches of the service, virtually irrespective of rank. Both the British and
the Japanese fell far behind in antisubmarine warfare. The Japanese stuck to
their Mahanian dogma of decisive naval
battle conducted by large battleships.
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The Americans, meanwhile, built a
more balanced fleet, able to starve Japan of supplies as well as defeat its
forces on land, in the air, and beneath
the sea.
When Kuehn writes of being collegial
and collaborative, this reviewer thought
of a perpetuation of the status quo,
since I was of the opinion that military
innovation is only the by-product of
egotistic individuals who are unable get
along with their fellow officers. Billy
Mitchell, J. F. C. Fuller, George Patton,
and Pete Ellis readily come to mind.
Kuehn points out yet another irony as
well—that the U.S. Navy of the 1920s
thrived because of financial constraints.
All naval officers with pulses and open
eyes could see that they could no longer
rely on their navy’s simply being bigger
than its prospective opponents. Hence
the institution entertained all serious
ideas of reform, so that the rebels, so to
speak, became the norm.
Although this is an excellent book, it is
not perfect. The discussion of flyingdeck cruisers (a model never put into
production) is too long. Chapter 8,
however, which compares innovation
or lack of it in the navies of Britain, Japan, and Germany, is about the best
writing I have seen on military development in the interwar years.
MICHAEL PEARLMAN

Lawrence, Kansas
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
(Retired)
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Warren Kozak captures the true essence
of General Curtis LeMay. Like many
great leaders, LeMay was a paradox, a
vivid contrast of unique strengths and
debilitating weaknesses. He was insecure, afraid of failure, always questioning his own decisions. LeMay hid his
insecurities beneath a stern and gruff
demeanor that gave the impression of
confidence and strength. The antithesis
of the stereotypical dashing American
flyboy, “LeMay was dark, brooding, and
forbidding. He rarely smiled, he spoke
even less, and when he did, his words
came out in a snarl.”
Always seeking to learn as much as he
could, LeMay not only flew airplanes
but took time to service and repair
them alongside his maintenance crew.
He made himself the best navigator in
the U.S. Army Air Corps. For example,
he successfully located the USS Utah in
a 120,000-square-mile area of the Pacific, and he found the Italian ocean
liner SS Rex in a large Atlantic storm.
As the United States entered World
War II LeMay commanded the 305th
Bomber Group, which began with only
three aircraft to train thirty-five crews.
He was a stern disciplinarian who
demanded excellence.
LeMay was always able to cut to the
heart of the matter. He devised radically
new tactics that improved bombing accuracy and reduced aircraft losses. To
build trust and confidence within his
crew, he led the missions himself. His
success was noticed, and as Generals
Hap Arnold’s and Ira Eaker’s “fireman”
he was given the toughest challenges to
overcome.
Kozak goes on to describe LeMay’s development of Strategic Air Command
(SAC), which supported his long-held
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